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Roosma F., Oorschot W. Between hope and fear? Regional 
and social dividing lines in attitudes towards an EU mini-
mum income scheme
Previous studies have suggested that Europeans’ support 
for introducing an EU minimum-income scheme would be 
determined by a hope-or-fear reasoning. Where Northern/
Western Europeans may fear that their generous benefits are 
levelled out, Southern/Eastern Europeans may be critical of 
their country’s welfare policies and therefore have hopes for 
a higher level of benefits and services coming from Europe. 
We tested this expected mediation effect in 18 EU member 
states. Results show that both performance evaluation of so-
cial benefits and expectations about EU interference predict 
support for an EU minimum-income scheme, following ex-
pected regional dividing lines. However, against theoretical 
expectations, there has been no substantial mediation effect. 
Where support for an EU minimum income scheme is based 
mostly on social dividing lines, expectations of the EU are 
related more to contextual differences. Citizens from coun-
tries that are net-receivers of the EU have higher hopes that 
EU interference will lead to higher benefits and services.
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In the process of European integration, social policy 
has been, and still is, a contested issue. Thus far, there 
are no binding obligations for EU countries to adhere 
and contribute to social policy arrangements for the 
European people at the European level. There is of 
course the ‘open method of coordination’ in employ-
ment and social inclusion (Vandenbroucke, 2017), 
there are EU social policy regulations and directives 
(Graziano & Hartlapp, 2019), there is the coordina-
tion of cross-border mobility and transferable social 
rights, and there are strong social impacts from the 
European structural funds and the free movement of 
people, goods and services (Faist, 2014; Gerhards & 
Lengfeld, 2013; Geyer, 2000). Nevertheless, we are 
still far from a full ‘Social Europe’ in which social pol-
icies and social rights for European citizens are directly 
regulated at the European level (Martinsen & Vollaard, 
2014). Empirical evidence shows even that there is a 
‘fatigue of social policy advancement’ at the EU level 
(Graziano & Hartlapp, 2019, p. 1498). Historically, the 
development of European social policies and the inher-
ent trans-national redistribution and solidarity that they 
would imply have proven not to be politically feasible. 
A main reason seems to be that there is too much di-
versity in Europe, in an institutional, socio-economic 
and cultural sense (Banchoff & Smith, 1999; Ferrera, 
2005; Habermas, 2013). This makes it difficult, as sug-
gested by Scharpf (2002), to reach an agreement on the 
types and levels of European social protection that are 
needed, as well as on who should benefit from it and 
who should contribute.
Although there is a rather extended literature about 
popular attitudes in favour or against the EU or European 
integration as an economic, political and social process 
(e.g., Anderson & Kaltenhaler, 1996; Gaxie, Hubé, & 
Rowell, 2011; Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018; 
Marks & Steenbergen, 2004; McLaren, 2006), support 
for the social policy role of the EU has been addressed 
in only a few public opinion studies thus far (Baute 
& Meuleman, 2020; Beaudonnet, 2014; Gerhards, 
Lengfeld, & Häuberer, 2016; Lengfeld, Schmidt, & 
Häuberer, 2015; Mau, 2005). Especially the study of 
Baute and Meuleman (2020) has advanced our knowl-
edge of both the individual and contextual characteris-
tics that determine support for an EU minimum-income 
scheme. They found that people’s expectations of the 
EU, of the welfare generosity of their own welfare 
state and their evaluation of their own welfare state’s 
performance influence support for an EU social policy 
intervention. The study also showed that lower social 
economic status groups are more in favour of an EU 
minimum-income scheme (Baute & Meuleman, 2020).
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In the present study, we aimed to further explore 
why people support the EU’s involvement in the so-
cial policy domain. What underlying mechanism can 
explain support for an EU minimum-income scheme? 
We focused on a specific theoretical explanation ad-
vocated, but not yet evidenced, in previous studies 
that suggests that support for developing EU social 
policies would be determined by a hope-or-fear rea-
soning that differs for European regions (Beaudonnet, 
2013; Burgoon, 2009; Mau, 2005; Ray, 2004). Where 
Northern/Western Europeans may fear that the stan-
dards of their generous benefits are levelled out by EU 
social policies, Southern/Eastern Europeans may be 
critical of their country’s welfare policies and there-
fore hope for higher level benefits and services coming 
from, or via, Europe. The reasoning suggests that pos-
itive/negative performance evaluations of social ben-
efits in one’s own country lead to the expectation that 
an EU-level social policy regulation would improve/
worsen social benefits in a country and in this way de-
termine people’s support for EU social policy. As said, 
this theoretical suggestion has not yet been empirically 
tested. Baute and Meuleman (2020) found an effect of 
welfare performance evaluation and of expectations of 
the EU on support for an EU minimum-income scheme, 
but whether or not the effect of performance evaluation 
on support for an EU minimum-income scheme is me-
diated by expectations of the EU, as the hope-or-fear 
reasoning suggests, was not examined.
With data from the repeat module on Welfare 
Attitudes in the newest European Social Survey (ESS 
2016, wave 8), we were able to test the hope-or-fear 
reasoning directly. The survey contains a measure of 
support for a far-reaching aspect of the EU social policy 
domain, namely an EU social regulation in the domain 
of minimum income protection. For this reason, in this 
study, we tested support for an EU minimum-income 
scheme, as a specific proposal for EU interference in 
the social policy domain.
In this study, we sought to answer the following re-
search questions: (i) What are European people’s evalu-
ations of the performance of welfare provision in their 
country; what are their expectations regarding the EU 
influence on their country’s welfare provision; and how 
strong is support for the possible implementation of an 
EU-wide minimum income protection scheme? (ii) Can 
this support be explained by ‘the hope-or-fear reasoning’, 
that is, is a relationship between critical evaluations of the 
welfare state and support for a EU social benefit mediated 
by people’s expectations that an EU-level social policy 
regulation would improve (hope) or worsen (fear) social 
benefits in their country? Additionally, we took into ac-
count and controlled for (other) individual- and contex-
tual-level factors in explaining expectations of the EU 
in providing social benefits and support for an EU-wide 
minimum income scheme.
With this article, we contribute to understanding 
European people’s support for EU social policy, its 
national differences across the EU and their social de-
terminants. We first review existing empirical studies 
in the field, thereby developing our analytical focus in 
more detail. In a next step, we discuss our data and an-
alytical strategy. Then, we present our results and end 
with conclusions and a discussion.
Between hope and fear, in support for EU social 
policy
Support for EU intervention in the social policy domain
As Baute, Meuleman, Abts and Swyngedouw (2018) ar-
gued, the EU influence in the social policy domain can 
express itself in various ways. Generally, people think 
it is a good idea that EU residents can carry their social 
benefits to other EU countries (Berg, 2007; Gerhard & 
Lengfeld, 2015). As argued by Gerhards and Lengfeld 
(2013), equality for EU-foreigners within the bounda-
ries of each member state is still very different from a 
truly trans-national EU solidarity, for example in the 
form of a shared European system of social protection, 
yet, people seem supportive towards introducing a uni-
form welfare system and thus, the harmonisation of na-
tional welfare states. But it must be noted that support 
differs: In more encompassing welfare states, people are 
less supportive (Baute & Meuleman, 2020; Gerhards et 
al., 2016). Other opinion studies show that people are 
much more reserved in their support for EU influence 
in the social policy domain. From Eurobarometer data, 
we know that in general the majorities of the citizenry 
of the Northern, Western and Mediterranean EU coun-
tries oppose the EU taking binding decisions on health 
and welfare policies (Mau, 2005). And re-distribution 
via structural funds (Beaudonnet, 2014; Lengfeld et al., 
2015) is not a popular way of organising European sol-
idarity. Proposals for establishing EU benefit schemes 
for EU citizens can be found in various policy propos-
als in the literature; see, for example, Dullien (2013) 
on an EU unemployment insurance schemes, Levy, 
Matsaganis, and Sutherland (2013) on an EU child 
benefit, Atkinson (2005, 2015) with his pioneering 
work on a EU-wide child basic income and Peña-Casas 
and Bouget (2014) on an EU minimum income benefit. 
Baute et al. (2018) regard this as the ‘most intrusive’ 
form of cross-national EU solidarity, meaning that such 
schemes may be most directly experienced by EU citi-
zens in terms of personal costs and revenues. To our 
knowledge, support for the concrete policy proposal 
for an EU minimum-income scheme has been studied 
only by Baute and Meuleman (2020). They found high 
but differing support for such a scheme, conditional on 
the context of the national welfare state’s generosity.
Also other studies have found considerable differ-
ences among the European countries: EU influence 
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in the social policy domain is less popular in the 
more developed welfare states compared with coun-
tries with lower levels and coverage of social pro-
visions (Gerhards et al., 2016). For instance, people 
in the Scandinavian countries more strongly oppose 
European shared decision-making in social policies 
than do people in Continental countries, while the 
Mediterranean people are comparatively stronger 
supporters (Beaudonnet, 2013; Mau, 2005). And in 
European countries with more generous welfare, 
there is less individual support for the EU giving pri-
ority to the fight against poverty and social exclusion 
(Burgoon, 2009).
Does hope-or-fear reasoning explain EU social policy 
support?
Several scholars give as an explanation that these dif-
ferences in support for European social policies are 
rooted in the performance evaluations of people’s 
own welfare states (Beaudonnet, 2013; Burgoon, 
2009; Gerhards et al., 2016; Mau, 2005; Ray, 2004), 
where, for example, Scandinavian people may fear 
that the standards of their generous benefits and ser-
vices will be levelled out in European social policies, 
whereas the Mediterranean and Eastern-European 
people are more critical about and therefore less at-
tached to, their own welfare policies and may hope 
for something better. This kind of hope-or-fear rea-
soning offers interesting suggestions, because if true, 
it would inform us about the motivational basis for 
different expectations that underlie popular ideas 
about European social policies in different countries 
and regions of Europe.
Empirical studies have found both some evidence 
in favour and some against this claim. Analyses of 
data from the Welfare Attitudes module of the ESS 
2008, wave 4, have shown first indications for the 
suggestion of country and regional differences in hope 
and fear regarding the outcomes of EU-regulated so-
cial policy, be it indirectly. That is, wherein people in 
Northern and Western welfare states are more over-
all positive about the role of the welfare state and 
its actual performance and outcome, in Southern and 
especially in Eastern European welfare states, peo-
ple are mostly performance critical, meaning that 
although they support a strong role for the welfare 
state, they are critical about their own welfare state’s 
performance (Roosma & van Oorschot, 2017). This 
could lead to the expectation that people in Eastern 
and Southern European countries could have higher 
expectations of the EU, as their national welfare state 
does not meet expectations. More specifically, Baute 
and Meuleman (2020) have presented evidence that 
welfare state generosity and higher perceived perfor-
mance are negatively related to support for an EU 
minimum-income scheme. They also found a posi-
tive relation between expectations about the EU’s 
impact on the support for this scheme. However, it is 
unclear if this expectation mediates the relation be-
tween perceived performance and EU social policy 
support.
If the hope-or-fear reasoning were true, we would 
find support for an EU minimum-income scheme to be 
higher if people expected it to result in an improvement 
of their social protection (hope), while support for an 
EU minimum-income scheme would be lower if peo-
ple expected it to result in a deterioration of their social 
protection (fear). Additionally, it leads to the expec-
tation that people’s hopes/fears are greater when they 
are more/less critical about the performance of their 
own welfare system. Based on this reasoning, it can 
be expected that expectations of the EU and support 
for an EU minimum-income scheme are lower in the 
more encompassing welfare states of Europe, notably 
in the Northern and Western countries. The expecta-
tions regarding the hope-or-fear reasoning are shown 
in Figure 1.
Individual and contextual factors
To take into account possible confounding individual-
level factors in the mediation effect of the hope-or-fear 
reasoning and to examine the underlying assumption of 
the hope-or-fear reasoning that regional dividing lines 
are driven by differences in economic situations, we 
discuss various individual and contextual factors that 
might explain differences in expectations of the EU 
and support for an EU minimum-income scheme.
In welfare attitudes research, it is generally as-
sumed that attitudes are influenced by two types of 
characteristics: the degree to which people are in a 
vulnerable position and therefore may experience 
a direct self-interest in welfare provision; and their 
ideational position regarding welfare, indicated by 
relevant values and ideologies they adhere to (Jæger, 
2006; Kangas, 1997; Linos & West, 2003). As for the 
role of self-interest, where ‘normally’ one could expect 
that people in more vulnerable social positions would 
be more in favour of welfare protection generally, it 
seems that in the case of EU-level social policy mat-
ters are not so straightforward. That is, following the 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of central variables..
Y: Support
EU minimum-income scheme 
M: Expectations 
Perceived effect 
of EU social policy: 





Individual and contextual factors 
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hope-or-fear logic, the effect of belonging to a lower 
socio-economic status group in society can differ quite 
a bit between the more or the less developed welfare 
states of Europe. While vulnerable people living in 
the less generous welfare states of Europe may have 
higher hopes for an improvement of their protection 
under a European scheme than do their compatriots 
who are better off, in the more generous welfare states 
of Europe the lower socio-economic status groups 
may actually be more fearful than their better-off fel-
low citizens. However, Gerhards et al. (2016) did not 
find evidence for clear socio-economic cleavages on 
support for an Europeanised social policy, also when 
differences between countries were taken into ac-
count. Country-level differences seem more import-
ant. Baute and Meuleman (2020) found a negative 
effect of socio-economic status on support for an EU 
minimum-income scheme; however, the explanatory 
power of this effect was small. We therefore controlled 
for factors that are usually recognised as indicating 
people’s self-interest in welfare provision: subjective 
income, educational level, work status, gender and 
age (Ervasti, Goul Andersen, Fridberg, & Ringdal, 
2012; Svallfors, 2012). Additionally, we considered 
the effects of ideational factors such as egalitarian-
ism and political stance. Welfare support is usually 
higher among people who are (more) egalitarian and 
more left-wing (Ervasti et al., 2012; Svallfors, 2012). 
Both Gerhards et al. (2016) and Baute and Meuleman 
(2020) found some expected (but small) effects for 
political affiliation on support for an EU welfare sys-
tem. Moreover, Baute, Meuleman and Abts (2019) and 
Baute and Meuleman (2020) found that people’s opin-
ions on EU social policy are also partly affected by 
their attitudes to Europe and Europeanisation as such. 
Verhaegen (2018) and Gerhards et al. (2016) showed 
similar findings for a selection of EU countries. We 
therefore controlled for the effect of affiliation with 
the EU.
Contextual-level characteristics could give us 
more insight into the reasons behind the regional 
differences that are assumed to underlie the hope-or-
fear reasoning. Because our data set included only 
18 country cases (of the 28 EU member states), it 
was not possible to assess the influence of multiple 
contextual factors simultaneously. We nevertheless 
wanted to get a somewhat deeper insight into these 
relations by analysing the role of country character-
istics one by one. The literature suggests mainly that 
economic types of factors may play a role, first indi-
cating a kind of ‘national-interest’ effect. Beaudonnet 
(2013) found that people living in countries that 
are net receivers of EU transfers are more support-
ive of EU-level decision-making on social policies 
than are people living in net contributing countries, 
while Burgoon (2009) found that support is higher 
in countries that receive more from structural funds. 
There may also be an effect of economic conditions 
in terms of ‘problem awareness’. Burgoon (2009) 
found that people give higher priority to the EU fight-
ing poverty and social exclusion in countries with a 
higher unemployment rate. Lastly, EU social policy 
may be conditioned by popular perceptions of a coun-
try’s wealth. Where this is lower one could expect 
more support for EU social policy, since, as Baute et 
al. (2019) suggested, in the less wealthy countries of 
EU, fear for welfare cutbacks and retrenchments may 
be assumed to be higher.
Data and methods
Data
We used the European Social Survey 2016/2017 
(round 8) that contains a broad welfare attitude mod-
ule. There are 18 countries, from different regions, 
included in the survey that are EU member states (at 
the moment of survey) (N = 35,450 respondents): the 
Northern European countries Finland (FI) and 
Sweden (SE); the Western European countries 
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), France 
(FR), Great Britain (GB), Ireland (IE) and The 
Netherlands (NL); the Eastern European countries 
the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary 
(HU), Lithuania (LI), Poland (PL) and Slovenia (SI); 
the Southern European countries Spain (ES), Italy 
(IT) and Portugal (PT). For the country level varia-
bles, we obtained data from the OECD Productivity 
Statistics database and the OECD Unemployment 
Indicator1 and from the EU Budget Financial report 
2014 (European Union, 2015).
Central variables Three variables were central in 
our analysis: the dependent variable (Y) ‘support 
for an EU minimum-income scheme’; a mediating 
variable (M) ‘hope or fear regarding EU decisions 
about social benefits’; and a main independent 
variable (X) ‘evaluations of the current social 
benefits in a country’.
Our data allowed for measuring people’s support 
for an EU minimum-income scheme (Y) by means of 
the question whether people are in favour or against a 
European Union-wide minimum income benefit. This 
measure refers to a social policy that is characterised as 
the ‘most intrusive’ form of cross-national EU solidar-
ity (Baute et al., 2018). The question in the ESS data 
is introduced with a specific definition of the policy 
proposal, which takes into account the fact that the (tax 
payers in the) richer member states pay more into such 
a scheme. Moreover, it is mentioned that the exact level 
of such scheme would differ for the different member 
1 https://www.oecd-ilibr ary.org/.
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states to take into account that the cost of living can 
differ substantially between EU states. The question 
reads as follows: ‘A European Union-wide social ben-
efit scheme includes all of the following: The purpose 
is to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all 
poor people in the European Union; The level of so-
cial benefit people receive will be adjusted to reflect 
the cost of living in their country; The scheme would 
require richer European Union countries to pay more 
into such a scheme than poorer European Union coun-
tries. Overall, would you be against or in favour of 
having such a European Union-wide social benefit 
scheme?’ Answer categories include: strongly against 
(1), against (2), in favour (3), strongly in favour (4). 
We created a dummy variable distinguishing between 
those in favour (1) and those against (0) the proposed 
EU minimum-income scheme.
Our second variable (M) measured the expecta-
tions of the EU regarding social benefits and ser-
vices specifically, and was phrased as follows: ‘If 
more decisions were made by the European Union 
rather than by national governments, do you think 
the level of social benefits and services provided in 
[country] would become higher or lower?’ Answer 
categories were based on a 5-point scale, recoded 
such that a higher score measured more ‘hope’ that 
the level of social benefits and services in a country 
would become (much) higher.
Lastly, our third item, the independent variable 
(X), measured people’s perceived performance of 
their welfare state. In previous studies using the ESS 
2008/2009 data, this concept was measured using 
a scale of six items, including an evaluation of the 
state of education, healthcare, affordable child care, 
the opportunity for young people to find a job, and 
perceived standard of living of elderly and unem-
ployed people (Roosma & van Oorschot, 2017). For 
ESS 2016/2017 data, two of these six items were 
not available: The evaluation of child care and of 
the opportunity for young people to find a job were 
not included in the survey. As the remaining items 
did not form a strong scale (Cronbach’s alpha of .65 
overall, ranging from .47 (FR) to .69 (HU) for dif-
ferent countries), we focused on the item that most 
directly measured the evaluation of social benefits, 
as that is the closest to our measure of support for 
an EU minimum-income scheme: the perceived stan-
dard of living of the unemployed. We are aware that 
there is some discrepancy between the focus on the 
unemployed – generally referring to those relying on 
(insurance based) unemployment benefits – and the 
target group of the outcome variable, that is, people 
with an income below the poverty line. A limitation 
of the available data set is that it does not include 
a measure of the evaluation of the standard of liv-
ing of the poor in a country. The chosen item was 
measured on an 11-point scale (0‒10). A higher per-
ceived standard of living indicates perception of a 
better performance.
The correlations between the different indicators 
were −0.18 between X and Y; .24 between M and Y; 
and −0.18 between X and M.
Control variables For socio-economic status, 
we used several measures. Subjective income was 
measured by asking people how they felt about their 
household income nowadays in four answer categories 
from ‘living comfortably’ to ‘finding it very difficult 
on present income’. Education was measured in 
five categories (reducing the ISCED categories to 
five levels from primary education (1) to higher 
education (5)). Third, we used dummy items for 
work status (the item measured ‘What have you 
been doing for the last seven days?’): paid work 
(reference), unemployed (both actively looking for 
a job and not actively looking for a job), retired, 
permanently sick or disabled, and other not in labour 
(community work, housework, other). Lastly, we 
used gender (reference: male) and age in years. For 
ideological affiliation, we chose the traditional left/
right self-placement scale (11-point scale) in three 
dummy variables left (score 0‒3, reference), middle 
(4‒6), right (7‒10). We used egalitarian values as a 
proxy for ideology (‘For a fair society, differences 
in standard of living should be small.’) on a 
5-point scale. Pro EU attitude was indicated with 
a measure of how emotionally attached people are 
to the EU on an 11-point scale. All linear variables 
were standardised.
Country level variables Indicators for GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parities (ppp) (* 1,000) and 
unemployment rate of the working-age population 
(15‒64) were measured in the year prior to the survey 
2015 and obtained from the OECD Productivity 
Statistics database and the Unemployment Indicator. 
The operating budgetary balance of the EU member 
states was measured with ‘the relationship between a 
member state’s share of total allocated EU operating 
expenditure and its share of ‘national contributions’ 
as a percentage of GNI, and was obtained from the EU 
Budget Financial report for the year 2014 (European 
Union, 2015). A positive percentage indicates that 
a country is a net receiver, a negative percentage 
indicates that a country is a net payer. The correlation 
between GDP per capita in ppp and operating 
budgetary balance was 0.679, and correlations 
with unemployment rate and GDP per capita and 
unemployment rate and operating budgetary balance 
were −0.110 and −0.099, respectively. All variables 
were centred.
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Methods
In the first step, we provided descriptive statistics of 
our three central variables of interest, answering our 
first research questions. In the next step, we performed 
a multilevel logistic regression analysis of the support 
for the EU minimum-income scheme variable and a 
multilevel regression analysis of the hope-or-fear vari-
able, testing the influence of the individual-level and 
contextual-level variables that could provide better in-
sight into the hope-or-fear reasoning. Each contextual 
factor was included in a separate model, to account for 
the low sample size at the macro level. To measure the 
explained level variance in the multilevel logistic re-
gression models, we followed instructions from 
Snijders and Bosker (2012, pp. 305–307).2
Lastly, we analysed the mediation effect, answer-
ing our research question 2. We used the KHB pack-
age in Stata, developed by Karlson, Holm, and Breen 
(Breen, Karlson, & Holm, 2013; Kohler, Karlson, & 
Holm, 2011). The KHB method is able to recover the 
degree to which a mediating variable explains the re-
lationship between X and Y, and it allows estimation 
of this effect for nonlinear probability models such as 
the logit model. A relevant feature of the KHB method 
is that it presents the coefficients on the same scale. 
For this reason, the magnitude of the log odds is hard 
to interpret. Therefore, after running the analysis, the 
confounding ratio and the confounding percentage can 
be calculated to interpret the magnitude of the indirect 
effect (Breen et al., 2013; Kohler et al., 2011). A Monte 
Carlo study comparing the KHB method with two other 
studies (Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010; Imai, Keele, & 
Yamamoto, 2010) showed that the studies performed 
equally well in recovering the true mediation percent-
age (Breen et al., 2013) and therefore the KHB model is 
also suitable for giving a causal interpretation of indi-
rect effects. The KHB model also allows the inclusion 
of the individual-level control variables (concomitant 
variables). Because the package does not allow the 
estimate of a multilevel logistic regression model, we 
applied it to a fixed effects logistic regression model by 
including the country dummies as well.
Results
In Figure 2, we present the main statistics of our 
three central variables of interest (see the Appendix, 
Table A1 for the full statistics). It shows that, over-
all, there is high support for an EU minimum-income 
scheme: Two thirds of the respondents in the total sam-
ple indicated that they were in favour of a EU social 
benefit scheme that provides a minimum standard of 
living to all poor people in the EU, and in only two 
(AT and NL) of the 18 countries was such a scheme 
supported by less than half of the population (see also 
Baute & Meuleman, 2020). These results confirm the 
results from Gerhards et al. (2016) regarding support 
for an EU uniform welfare system, for a selection of 
European countries (Germany, Spain and Poland). 
Figure 2 also shows European regional differences. In 
Northern and Western European countries, the majority 
of the people asked were in favour of the scheme (with 
AT and NL as the only exceptions), but in Eastern and 
Southern European countries support levels were nota-
bly higher, with a peak of 91% in Portugal. Exceptions 
here were the Czech Republic and Estonia, the support 
2 We computed the linear predictor for Ŷij and used its ob-
served variance. The observed variance is divided by the total 
variance (the sum of the variance of the linear predictor, the vari-
ance of the random intercept and the fixed value of the level-one 
residual variance (π2/3)).
Figure 2. Descriptive statistics of three central variables in the hope-or-fear reasoning. Note: Design and population weights are applied 
according to ESS guidelines.
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levels of which were closer to that of Western European 
countries.
Regarding hope or fear about the effects of EU de-
cision-making on the quality of social benefits and ser-
vices in one’s country, Figure 2 clearly shows higher 
levels of ‘hope’ in Southern and Eastern European 
countries that social protection will improve, espe-
cially in Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Estonia, than 
in Western and Northern European countries. In the 
former regions, ‘hope’-levels were between about 40 
and 70%, while in the Northern and Western European 
this was only between 10 and 20% (with the UK’s 
31% being an exception, which might imply that some 
Britons hope to catch up with the more generous wel-
fare states on the European continent).
Lastly, Figure 2 shows that people in Eastern and 
Southern European countries were much more critical 
about the performance of their welfare state in pro-
viding a decent standard of living for the unemployed 
(with the CZ as an exception), while Western Europeans 
were more positive or moderate in their critique.
Multivariate analyses
Individual-level effects Next, we present our 
multivariate analyses. In Table 1, we present the 
multilevel logistic regression models. Model 1.0 is the 
null model, including only a random intercept. The 
intra-class correlation (ICC) was .148, which suggests 
that about 15% of the variation in the outcome variable 
could be attributed to differences at the country 
level. In Model 1.1, we added the individual-level 
control variables as well as the hope-or-fear variable 
(expectations). This hope-or-fear variable showed a 
relatively strong positive effect, compared with the 
other individual-level indicators. In addition, we found 
that people with a lower subjective income and 
lower education, and people who were unemployed 
were stronger supporters of an EU-wide minimum-
income scheme. And, as expected, people who had 
stronger egalitarian values, defined themselves as 
politically left-wing and felt attached to the EU were 
also more in favour of an EU social benefit. This 
confirms the results of Baute and Meuleman (2020). 
Model 1.2 adds the effect of the evaluation of the 
standard of living of the unemployed. As expected, 
following the hope-or-fear reasoning, the more 
negative people perceived the standard of living of the 
unemployed in their country, the greater was the support 
for an EU minimum-income scheme. This model 
tested the total effect of the dependent variable. In Model 
1.3, both factors were included to show the direct effect, 
controlling for the possible mediator ‘expectations of 
EU social policy’. This model provided only a first 
indication, as the test of the KHB model for the full 
mediation analysis is shown below. The percentage 
explained variance of Model 1.1 (9.97%) and Model 
1.2 (6.97%) showed that expectations of EU social 
policy explained more variation in an EU minimum-
income scheme support than did the evaluation of the 
welfare state performance.
In Table 2, we show the relationship between per-
formance evaluations of the welfare state and the hope-
or-fear expectations regarding the EU. Model 2.0 was 
Table 1. Multilevel logistic regression models: dependent variable: support for EU minimum-income scheme.
Standardised individual level variables
Model 1.0 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Expectations of the EU (hope or fear) 0.380*** 0.016 0.374*** 0.016
Evaluation of standard of living as 
unemployed
−0.172*** 0.016 −0.165*** 0.016
Subjective income −0.061*** 0.017 −0.041* 0.016 −0.047** 0.017
Education −0.074*** 0.016 −0.112*** 0.015 −0.082*** 0.016
Work status (ref. paid work)
In education 0.134* 0.060 0.117* 0.058 0.120* 0.060
Unemployed 0.258*** 0.067 0.241*** 0.065 0.229** 0.068
Disabled 0.013 0.084 0.110 0.082 0.119 0.085
Retired 0.013 0.048 0.025 0.046 0.010 0.048
Other 0.092* 0.044 0.076 0.043 0.086 0.044
Left–right self-placement −0.221*** 0.015 −0.203*** 0.015 −0.209*** 0.015
Egalitarian 0.293*** 0.014 0.289*** 0.014 0.279*** 0.015
Feel attached to EU 0.219*** 0.015 0.248*** 0.015 0.233*** 0.016
Age −0.028 0.024 −0.069** 0.022 −0.041 0.024
Gender (ref. is male) 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.014
Intercept 0.851*** 0.178 0.837*** 0.148 0.832*** 0.160 0.848*** 0.140
N 18 18 18 18
Groups 32,587 26,540 27,844 26,225
Variance random intercept 0.570 0.384 0.450 0.337
Variance linear predictor 0.407 0.280 0.457
Explained variance (%) 9.97 6.97 11.19
Note: Significance levels ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.
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the null model, including only a random intercept. The 
intra-class correlation (ICC) is .221, which was sub-
stantially high, and suggests that 22% of the variation 
in individual-level expectations were related to differ-
ences between countries. Another indication for this 
was found in Model 2.1, where the individual-level 
variables were added. There was a significant effect 
of performance evaluation on the expectation attitude, 
but the effect size was small. Also the other individu-
al-level indicators showed only small effect sizes and 
contributed very little to the explained variance. Lower 
educated people, egalitarians and people who feel at-
tached to the EU were found to be more hopeful to-
wards EU social policy. Remarkable is the relatively 
strong effect of age (compared with the insignificant 
effect of age on support for EU social benefit). It ap-
pears that younger people have higher expectations 
of EU social policy than do older people. This can be 
interpreted as encouraging for the future of EU social 
policy-making in case it is a cohort effect, but less so if 
it is an age effect.
Contextual-level effects In Table 3, contextual-level 
variables were tested separately in different models. 
All models were controlled for all individual-level 
variables. As for support for an EU minimum-income 
scheme, we see that all our three contextual level 
indicators were associated with such support. A higher 
unemployment rate (Model 1.4) and lower wealth 
(GDP per capita) (Model 1.5) in a country related to 
higher support for an EU minimum-income scheme. 
This confirms that economic conditions in a country 
(possibly via affecting problem awareness and fear 
for welfare retrenchment) are important conditions in 
what people expect from the EU (Burgoon, 2009), 
which is an assumption underlying the hope-or-
fear reasoning. Additionally, a ‘national interest’ 
factor seems to play a role as well, since in countries 
that are net-receivers of the EU, support was found 
to be higher (Model 1.6). We assume that this effect 
works via the mechanisms that people in these 
countries have positive, personal experience with EU 
involvement improving conditions in their country. 
All context variables had comparable levels of 
explained variance.
Table 3. Contextual effects on support for EU minimum-income scheme and expectations (hope or fear).
Model Context variables (centred)








M1.4 Unemployment rate 0.087** 0.029 0.221 0.658 15.78 18
M1.5 Operating budgetary balance 0.158* 0.063 0.248 0.638 15.28 18
M1.6 GDP per capita in ppp * 1,000 −0.236* 0.000 0.273 0.639 15.21 18
Expectation (hope or fear)




country level N group
M2.2 Unemployment rate 0.020 0.027 0.201 0.765 9.05 18
M2.3 Operating budgetary balance 0.187*** 0.036 0.082 0.765 62.90 18
M2.4 GDP per capita in ppp * 1,000 −0.331*** 0.061 0.079 0.765 64.25 18
M2.5 Operating budgetary balance 0.106* 0.044 0.060 0.765 72.85 18
GDP per capita in ppp * 1,000 −0.198* 0.077
Note: Models are controlled for all individual level variables. Significance levels ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.
Table 2. Multilevel linear regression models – dependent variable: 
expectations of the EU (hope or fear).
Model 2.0 Model 2.1
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Evaluation standard of living 
as unemployed
−0.035*** 0.006
Subjective income −0.009 0.006
Education −0.057*** 0.006
Work status (ref. paid work)





Left–right self-placement −0.003 0.006
Egalitarian 0.041*** 0.006
Feel attached to EU 0.081*** 0.006
Age −0.054*** 0.009
Gender (ref. is male) −0.004 0.005
Intercept 0.031 0.111 0.022 0.108
N 31,764 27,284
Groups 18 18
Variance group 0.221 0.207
Variance residuals 0.781 0.765
Explained variance group (%) 6.33
Explained variance residuals 
(%)
2.05
Note: Significance levels ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.
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With regard to the expectations in the EU, the 
unemployment rate did not have a significant effect 
(Model 2.2). However, both operating budgetary bal-
ance (Model 2.3) and GDP per capita (Model 2.4) 
showed strong significant effects and explained a 
large share of the country level variation. Model 2.5 
shows that both indicators showed significant effects 
also in the event they were both added to the model. 
The explained variance at the country level increased 
to almost 73%. This confirms that differences in ex-
pectations of the EU are not so much related to indi-
vidual differences between social groups, but instead 
are strongly determined by the characteristics of the 
country. In poorer countries that on net balance re-
ceive money from the EU, hopes are higher that the 
EU policy-making would also positively influence 
their country’s social policies. Again, this is in line 
with the hope-or-fear reasoning that expects that 
regional differences in expectations of the EU are 
partly determined by the economic circumstances and 
the (financially) positive influence of EU policies in 
a country.
Mediation effect: hope-or-fear reasoning In 
this final step, we performed the KHB analysis to 
test the total, direct and indirect effect of our variables 
measuring the hope-or-fear reasoning. For this 
analysis, we specified the dependent variable support 
for an EU minimum-income scheme, the explanatory 
variable evaluation of welfare performance, and the 
mediator variable expectation of the EU. Also, all 
individual-level control variables, as well as dummies 
for the countries, were added as concomitant variables. 
The KHB analysis provided us with the estimated 
effect for the reduced model (the total effect), the full 
model (the direct effect, controlled for the mediating 
variable) and the estimated difference between the 
models (the indirect effect).
Table 4 shows that the estimated effect of evalua-
tion of welfare performance in the reduced model was 
−0.176 and significant. The direct effect, taking into 
account the mediating variable expectation of the EU, 
was −0.163 and significant and the estimated differ-
ence, the indirect effect of the mediating variable ex-
pectation of the EU, was therefore only −0.013. The 
confounding ratio shows that the total effect was 1.08 
times larger than the direct effect, and the confounding 
percentage indicates that only 7.5% of the total effect 
could be attributed to the mediating variable, expecta-
tions of the EU. We conclude that, although the indi-
rect effect was significant, it was not substantial. Only 
a very small proportion of the effect of the evaluation 
of welfare performance on support for an EU mini-
mum-income scheme was mediated by expectations of 
the EU. Thus, despite the fact that expectations of the 
EU have a strong independent effect on support for an 
EU minimum-income scheme, no substantial mediation 
effect was found. This leads us to conclude that the ex-
pectation that the hope-or-fear reasoning could explain 
support for an EU minimum-income scheme must be 
rejected.
Conclusions
Knowledge about expectations regarding the EU 
social policy domain as they are prevailing among 
populations of different European countries, and 
among different social categories within countries, 
would importantly contribute to our understanding 
of the feasibility of developing the social domain 
further at the European level. In this study, we ex-
amined to what extend Europeans support introduc-
ing an EU social benefit scheme that guarantees a 
minimum income level for the poor. Previous studies 
suggested that this support would be determined by 
a hope-or-fear reasoning. That is, as we know that 
especially citizens in Eastern and Southern European 
countries are very critical about the performance of 
their welfare state, expectations were that this would 
lead to higher hopes that EU involvement in social 
policies would increase levels of social protection 
by means of social benefits and services and, there-
fore, to stronger support for an EU minimum-income 
scheme. For Northern and Western Europeans, this 
would work differently; a relatively positive evalu-
ation of their countries’ welfare provisions would 
be expected to lead to the fear that EU interference 
would worsen social benefits and services and, there-
fore, lower support for an EU minimum-income 
scheme.
We found that, at the time of the study, European 
people’s support for a minimum income level for 
poor Europeans was very high overall; two-thirds of 
Europeans were in favour. Support levels were espe-
cially high not only in Eastern and Southern European 
countries, but also in the Northern and Western 
regions of Europe, people showed high levels of 
Table 4. Mediation effect – KHB method.
Coefficient SE
Reduced model (total effect) −0.176*** 0.016
Full model (direct effect) −0.163*** 0.016
Difference (indirect effect) −0.013*** 0.002
Confounding ratio 1.08
Confounding percentage 7.52
Note: Model type: logistic regression, fixed effects model. Dependent variable: 
Support for EU minimum-income scheme. Mediating variable: Expectations 
of the EU. Independent variable: Evaluation standard of living unemployed. 
Controlled for individual level variables and country dummies. N: 26,225. 
Significance levels ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.
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support for it. Support was found to be related to in-
dividual- and contextual-level characteristics. People 
in worse socio-economic situations and people who 
are more egalitarian and pro-EU showed higher lev-
els of support for an EU minimum-income scheme 
(see also Baute & Meuleman, 2020). In countries 
with lower wealth and higher unemployment levels, 
support was higher, as well as in countries that were 
net receivers of the EU. Individual expectations of 
the EU were found to be strongly determined by con-
textual-level factors and, rather surprisingly, not very 
much by individual factors. We found that in coun-
tries that are less wealthy, have a positive budgetary 
balance and are thus net receivers of the EU, people 
have more hope that the EU level decision-making 
would improve benefit levels in their country. These 
results can be interpreted as an expression of the 
expected dividing lines between Northern/Western 
and Eastern/Southern European countries in the 
hope-or-fear reasoning. The support for an EU min-
imum-income scheme is partly explained by these 
expectations, but in addition also by social dividing 
lines within the populations in different countries.
However, our main theoretical expectation, the 
hope-or-fear reasoning, was rejected. Expectations of 
the effects of EU level decision-making (hope-or-fear) 
did not substantially mediate the relationship between 
critical performance evaluations and support for an EU 
minimum-income scheme. Clearly, performance eval-
uations and expectations of the EU have separate and 
independent effects on support for an EU minimum-in-
come scheme, both in expected directions (lower per-
formance evaluations and higher expectations leading 
to more support). The question remains as to what types 
of reasonings, if not hope-or-fear, lead people to sup-
port the EU social policy domain. Based on the individ-
ual-level effects in our model, ideological and political 
ideas seem more relevant, compared with people’s 
socio-structural positions, as well as feeling attached 
to the EU. These factors, as well as other reasons and 
reasonings, should be studied in more detail, while also 
theoretical expectations should be developed.
What implications do our findings have for discus-
sions about the (future) integration of the EU in the 
field of social policy? Of course, more attitude studies 
should be carried out, measuring support for a range of 
types of possible European social policies, with also 
a view on possible conditions that people would con-
nect to being in favour or against such policies, to get a 
more complete view of reasonings about Social Europe 
and reasons for supporting further European integra-
tion in the social domain. But in our view, the fact that 
about two-thirds of Europeans would be in favour of 
an EU minimum-income scheme for the poor is rather 
striking and may fuel dreams of the viability of trans-
national solidarity within Europe. Clearly, enthusiasm 
for an EU minimum-income scheme for the poor is 
higher in the Southern and Eastern regions of Europe. 
Here, people are more critical about the performance 
of their own welfare state, more people expect posi-
tive effects of EU-level decision-making on their so-
cial protection levels and countries in these regions are 
more of net-receivers from the EU than net-payers. But 
again, in most countries in the Western and Northern 
regions of Europe, more than half of their populations 
were also found to be in favour of an EU social ben-
efit, although here people are less critical, have lower 
expectations from the EU and although these countries 
are net-payers.
Although Baute et al. (2018) regarded an EU mini-
mum-income scheme as the ‘most intrusive’ type of EU 
social policy, given its direct impact on people’s life, 
support was found to be substantially high, especially 
when considering that such a scheme challenges the 
boundaries and decision-making power of the national 
welfare states to a great extent. A possible explanation 
might be that support for the EU social policy domain 
is higher when it focuses directly on the specific goal 
of alleviating poverty among Europeans, instead of 
involving more abstract discussions about citizenship 
rights or member state solidarity between nation states. 
Future research should look into support for different 
EU social policies in more detail.
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Appendix 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the central variables.
Country
Support for EU minimum-income 
scheme (0‒1 scale) Expectation EU benefit scheme (hope or fear) (1‒5 scale)
Evaluation standard of living unemployed 
(0‒10 scale)
% (str) against % (str) in favour % fear (1‒2) % hope (4‒5) Mean SD % <5 % >5 Mean SD
Total 33.33 66.67 36.84 30.07 2.927 .937 60.19 20.26 3.940 2.053
North
FI 49.33 50.67 64.51 7.99 2.360 .737 55.63 26.16 4.345 1.775
SE 46.15 53.85 61.87 8.06 2.369 .795 51.91 22.00 4.380 1.674
West
AT 51.99 48.01 62.35 12.13 2.350 .959 32.49 45.29 5.431 2.074
BE 32.72 67.28 51.02 14.61 2.600 .798 32.63 40.38 5.160 1.737
DE 38.84 61.16 50.57 17.07 2.648 .826 51.42 26.06 4.491 1.861
FR 40.99 59.01 49.86 16.84 2.604 .875 53.47 20.53 4.318 1.828
GB 48.82 51.18 32.60 31.36 3.002 .891 49.13 29.90 4.606 1.939
IE 32.46 67.54 56.99 21.60 2.565 .955 41.19 38.76 4.873 2.055
NL 50.54 49.46 61.67 13.31 2.474 .796 34.11 40.62 5.076 1.548
East
CZ 40.27 59.73 23.93 46.09 3.309 1.063 49.87 29.06 4.422 2.158
EE 33.61 66.39 13.22 54.03 3.461 .817 73.82 9.42 3.214 1.837
HU 19.13 80.87 20.67 47.40 3.294 .951 74.36 10.14 3.232 1.870
LT 15.57 84.43 5.18 67.43 3.806 .820 64.97 17.71 3.572 2.204
PL 21.51 78.49 11.23 56.82 3.541 .836 75.46 9.70 3.195 1.912
SI 13.80 86.20 13.34 49.69 3.386 .764 77.40 9.96 3.029 1.992
South
ES 13.62 86.38 21.83 51.64 3.322 .904 80.32 5.26 2.911 1.754
IT 16.95 83.05 18.46 36.98 3.204 .846 80.36 7.82 2.700 1.967
PT 8.91 91.09 11.23 56.82 3.262 .887 79.66 6.17 2.823 1.930
Note: Design and population size weights are applied.
